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Abstract
In this paper, the security-guaranteed filtering problem isstudied for a class of nonlinear stochastic discrete
time-delay systems with randomly occurring sensor saturations (ROSSs) and randomly occurring deception attacks
(RODAs). The nonlinearities in systems satisfy the sector-bounded conditions and the time-varying delays are
unknown with given lower and upper bounds. A novel measurement output model is proposed to reflect both the
ROSSs and the RODAs. A new definition is put forward on the security level with respect to the noise intensity,
the energy bound of the false signals, the energy of the initial system state and the desired security degree. We
aim at designing a filter such that, in the presence of ROSSs and RODAs, the filtering error dynamics achieves
the prescribed level of security. By using the stochastic analysis techniques, a sufficient condition is first derived
under which the filtering error system is guaranteed to have the desired security level, and then the filter gain is
designed by solving a linear matrix inequality with nonlinear constraints. Finally, a numerical example is provided
to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed filtering scheme.
Index Terms
Security-guaranteed filtering, nonlinear stochastic system , discrete time-delay systems, randomly occurring
sensor saturations, randomly occurring deception attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In reality, most physical systems are inherently nonlinearand the nonlinearity results in considerable system
complexity. In engineering practice such as maneuverable targe tracking and mobile robot navigation, one often
needs to estimate the true value of states of the nonlinear systems based on some potentially noisy measurement
outputs, and such nonlinear filtering problems have been attracting considerable research interest in the past few
decades due to their wide application potentials. A number of efficient algorithms have been developed to solve
the nonlinear filtering problems, among which the most renowned one is arguably the extended Kalman filtering
approach that is applicable to linearized systems with Gaussi n noises of known statistics. In addition, theH∞
and robust filters for nonlinear systems have been paid much attention due to their excellent robustness against
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the exogenous disturbances and parameter uncertainties. For example, the extended Kalman filtering problems
for nonlinear system have been investigated in [16], [17]. The H∞ filter has been designed for systems with
affine nonlinearities [1], sector-bounded nonlinearities[25], nonlinear fractional transformations [37] and randomly
occurring nonlinear disturbances [10]. In [28], the robustfiltering problem has been investigated for a class of
discrete-time uncertain stochastic nonlinear time-delaysystems with both the probabilistic missing measurements
and external stochastic disturbances.
In practice, due to a variety of reasons such as the unmodeledinertia of system components and the finite speeds
of the transmitting signals, the time delay has proven to be ap rvasive phenomenon with many dynamic systems.
In recent years, the study of time-delay systems has attracted much attention and a large number of research results
have been reported in the literature, see e.g. [5], [13], [14], [29], [30], [33], [34]. Different types of time-delays (e.g.
constant delays, time-varying delays, discrete delays anddistributed delays) have been thoroughly investigated in
the analysis and control problems by using a variety of methods such as the linear matrix inequality approach, the
Lyapunov functional method, theM -matrix theory, the topological degree theory as well as thegeneral inequality
techniques. For instance, in [29], time-varying mode-dependent delays have been considered in the robustH∞
filtering problem. In [13], a robustH∞ filter has been designed for linear discrete-time uncertainsystems with
multiple delays in the states by using a delay-dependent appro ch. Very recently, a reliable filter has been designed
in [27] for a class of discrete-time piecewise linear systems with both sensor failures and infinite distributed delays.
As is well known, the filtering performance is highly dependet on the information knowna priori on the available
measurements and the sensors responsible for collecting/tra smitting signals play a vitally important role in the
filtering process. A particular phenomenon that occurs often to the sensors is the so-called saturation resulting from
physical, safety or technological constraints on the components of the system such as battery capacity, power limit
and intermittent failures. Sensor saturations are essentially a nonlinear behavior that could lead to poor performances
or even instability of the system. In the context of nonlinear filtering, much work has recently been done to attenuate
the effects from the sensor saturation phenomenon or packetlosses on the overall filtering performance, see. e.g.
[15], [22], [26], [31], [32], [35], [36]. For example, theH∞ filter has been designed in [26] for systems with
both sensor saturations and missing measurements. In [15],the probability-guaranteedH∞ finite-horizon filtering
problem has been investigated for a class of nonlinear time-varying systems with sensor saturations.
With rapid development of communication networks, many comp nents of physical systems (e.g. actuators,
sensors and state estimators) are required to share a commonco munication link [6]–[9], [11], [19], [20]. Due to
the strong opening-up property of a shared network, the datareceived by sensors may be transmitted over the network
without security protections. As such, attackers can arbitrarily intercept, tamper or retransmit the data transmitted
in the network and hence destabilize the plant or steer the plant to their desired operating points. Therefore, the
attack behaviours for physical systems have attracted muchattention in recent years, and some preliminary results
related to this emerging topic of research have been reported in the literature, see e.g. [2], [3], [12], [21], [24],
[38]. It should be pointed out that, deception attacks (or false data injection attacks) are considered to be the most
dangerous attack behaviours since attackers can inject themalicious data in order to degrade or even deteriorate
the performance of systems. For example, in [2], a defendingmechanism against false data injection attacks has
been proposed for state estimation of power system in terms of graphical methods and the main results have then
been extended in [3]. Nevertheless, when the system is subject to both sensor saturations and deception attacks in
a possibly random way, the corresponding security-guaranteed filtering problem has not been investigated yet, not
to mention the case when nonlinearities and time-delays arealso present. It is, therefore, the main motivation of
this paper to shorten such a gap.
The contributions of the paper are summarized as follows. 1)A new research problem of security-guaranteed filter
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design is proposed for nonlinear stochastic discrete time-delay systems with randomly occurring sensor saturations
as well as deception attacks. 2) A novel model for measurement outputs is put forward to account for the sensor
saturations and the deception attacks that are randomly occurring according to two sets of Bernoulli distributed
white sequences. 3) In order to quantify the security degree, w introduce a new concept of mean square security
domain. 4) A sufficient condition is derived under which the filtering error dynamics achieves the desired degree of
security and then the desired filter gain is obtained by solving a linear matrix inequality with nonlinear constraints.
This paper is organized as follows. Security-guaranteed filtering problem for nonlinear stochastic discrete time-
delay systems with randomly occurring sensor saturations as well as deception attacks is presented in Section II,
where we propose a novel model for measurement outputs and a new concept of mean-square security domain to
describe this issue. Then, in Section III, with the help of the stochastic analysis techniques, a sufficient condition is
derived to make the filtering error dynamics to achieve the desired degree of security and the desired filter gain is
obtained subsequently. Finally, an illustrative example is presented to show the effectiveness of the filtering scheme
proposed in Section IV.
Notation The notation used here is fairly standard except where otherwis stated.Rn and Rn×m denote,
respectively, then dimensional Euclidean space and the set of alln × m real matrices. The notationX ≥ Y
(respectively,X > Y ), whereX andY are real symmetric matrices, means thatX − Y is positive semi-definite
(respectively, positive definite).MT represents the transpose of the matrixM . I denotes the identity matrix of
compatible dimension. diag{· · · } stands for a block-diagonal matrix.N+ indicates the positive integer set.λmax(A)
andλmin(A) denote the maximum and minimum eigenvalue ofA, respectively.E{x} stands for the expectation
of the stochastic variablex. ‖x‖ describes the Euclidean norm of a vectorx. In symmetric block matrices, “∗”
is used to denote a term induced by symmetry. Matrices, if they ar not explicitly specified, are assumed to have
compatible dimensions.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider the following discrete-time nonlinear stochastic ystem with time delays
x(k + 1) =Ax(k) +Adx(k − d(k)) +Bf(x(k)) +Bdfd(x(k − d(k))) +D1w(k),
x(j) =ϕ(j), j = −dM ,−dM + 1, . . . ,−1, 0,
(1)
wherex(k) ∈ Rnx is the state vector,w(k) ∈ R is a zero-mean Gaussian white noise sequence withEw2(k) ≤ δ2,
A, Ad, B, Bd, andD1 are known real constant matrices with appropriate dimensions.ϕ(j) (j = −dM ,−dM +
1, . . . ,−1, 0) are the initial conditions, which are assumed to be independent of the process{w(k)}k∈N+ .




T [fd(x)− T2x] ≤0,
(2)
whereK1, K2, T1 andT2 are known real matrices of appropriate dimensions.K = K1 −K2 andT = T1 −T2 are
symmetric positive definite matrices.
For the system (1), the positive integerd(k) denotes the time-varying delay satisfying
dm ≤ d(k) ≤ dM , k ∈ N
+, (3)
where the lower boundm and the upper boundM are known positive integers.
FINAL VERSION 4
The sensor measurement model with randomly occurring saturations and deception attacks is described by
ỹ(k) =α(k)σ(Cx(k)) + (1− α(k))Cx(k) +D2w(k),
y(k) =ỹ(k) + β(k)v(k),
v(k) =− ỹ(k) + ξ(k),
(4)
where ỹ(k) ∈ Rny is the measurement outputs with randomly occurring sensor saturations (ROSSs),y(k) ∈ Rny
is the received measurement outputs with randomly occurring deception attacks (RODAs),v(k) ∈ Rny stands for
the signal sent by adversaries with the non-zeroξ(k) ∈ Rny satisfying
‖ ξ(k) ‖≤ δ1. (5)
for a given positive scalarδ1. C andD2 are known real constant matrices with appropriate dimensions.
Remark 1:When launching deception attacks, the attackers inject malicious data in order to degrade or deteriorate
the system performances. In (4), the external signals (injected false data) sent by the adversaries are justv(k)
and the attackers do not need to know the exact information about ỹ(t). The reason for us to rewritev(k) as
v(k) = −ỹ(k) + ξ(k) is just for the analysis convenience. Note that the “deception function” ξ(k) is assumed to
satisfy the boundedness condition (5) for the specific classof deception attacks considered in this paper.
The saturation functionσ(·) is defined as
σ(u) =
[
σ(u1) σ(u2) . . . σ(uny)
]T
, ∀u ∈ Rny (6)
whereσ(ui) = sign(ui)min{ui, |ui|} for i = 1, 2, · · · , ny. Here, sign(·) denotes the signum function andui is
the saturation level. From the definition of saturation function σ(·), there exists a diagonal matrixΛ satisfying
0 ≤ Λ < I and
[σ(u)− Λu]T [σ(u)− u] ≤ 0. (7)
The stochastic variablesα(k) and β(k) are two mutually independent Bernoulli distributed white sequences
taking values on0 or 1 with the following probabilities
Prob{α(k) = 0} =1− ᾱ, Prob{α(k) = 1} = ᾱ,
Prob{β(k) = 0} =1− β̄, Prob{β(k) = 1} = β̄,
(8)
whereᾱ ∈ [0, 1) and β̄ ∈ [0, 1) are two known constants.
Remark 2: In reality, the physical parameters of a networked environme t (e.g. network load, network congestion,
network transmission rate) are typically randomly fluctuated and, from the defenders’ perspective, the attacks
successfully passing through the detectors may occur intermit ntly or randomly. In other words, the successes of
the attacks are largely dependent on the randomly changing network conditions and the given value ofβ̄ represents
the success rate for launched attacks that can be estimated through statistical tests or specified according to the
security requirements.
Based on the measurements mentioned before, the following filter structure is adopted
x̂(k + 1) = Fx̂(k) +Ny(k),
x̂(j) = 0, j = −dM ,−dM + 1, . . . ,−1, 0,
(9)
wherex̂(k) ∈ Rnx is the state estimate,F andN are the filter parameters to be determined.x̂(j) (j = −dM ,−dM+
1, . . . ,−1, 0) are the estimates of initial states.
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By letting the filtering errore(k) = x(k)− x̂(k), it follows from (1), (4) and (9) that
e(k + 1) =Fe(k) + [A− (1− α(k))(1 − β(k))NC − F ]x(k) +Adx(k − d(k))
− [α(k)(1 − β(k))N ]σ(Cx(k)) + [D1 − (1− β(k))ND2]w(k)
+Bf(x(k)) +Bdfd(x(k − d(k))) − β(k)Nξ(k).
(10)
It is easily seen that the initial errors satisfye(j) = x(j) = ϕ(j) (j = −dM ,−dM + 1, . . . ,−1, 0).
We introduce the following definition.
Definition 1: Let the positive constant scalarsδ, δ1, δ2 andδ3 be given. The filtering error system (10) is said to
be (δ, δ1, δ2, δ3)-secureif, when Ew2(k) ≤ δ2, ‖ξ(k)‖ ≤ δ1 and sup
−dM≤i≤0
E‖ϕ(i)‖2 ≤ δ22 , one hasE‖e(k)‖
2 ≤ δ23
for all k ≥ dM + 1.
In this paper, our main purpose is to design a filter for system(1) with measurement outputs described by (4)
such that the filtering error system (10) is(δ, δ1, δ2, δ3)-secure.
Remark 3: In the framework ofH∞ filtering, the exogenous disturbances are usually assumed to satisfy the
energy-bounded conditions. In other words, the signals intensi y from the outside will decrease gradually to zero as
time tends to infinity. Such an assumption is, however, unsuitable for the deception attacks because the adversaries
would launch uninterrupted attacks with non-zero intensitie . In the presence of persistent attacks with non-zero
intensities, it is only possible to ensure the boundedness (a opposed to the conventional zero-equilibrium inH∞
filtering) of the filtering error which is essentially the requirement of the so-called security-guaranteed filtering. As
such, instead of the energy-bounded condition, a norm-bounded condition is imposed on the external attack signals
so as to make it possible to guarantee the boundedness (security) of the filtering errors.
III. M AIN RESULTS
In this section, we first derive a sufficient condition under which the filtering error system (10) is(δ, δ1, δ2, δ3)-
secure in the presence of both ROSSs and RODAs. Based on the obtained condition, the design method of the
desired filter is then given.
For the convenience of the manipulation, we setη(k) =
[
xT (k) eT (k)
]T
, and then the dynamic system (1)
and the filtering error system (10) can be combined into an augmented system as follows:
η(k + 1) =Āη(k) + Ãdη(k − d(k)) + B̃f(H1η(k)) + B̃dfd(H1η(k − d(k)))













































The following lemma will be used in the proof of our main result in this paper.
Lemma 1: [4] Given constant matricesS1, S2 andS3, whereS1 = ST1 andS2 = S
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In the following theorem, a sufficient condition is providedunder which the filtering error system (10) is
(δ, δ1, δ2, δ3)-secure.
Theorem 1:Let the positive scalarsδ, δ1, δ2, δ3 and the filter gainsF , N be given. The filtering error system
(10) is (δ, δ1, δ2, δ3)-secure if there exist positive definite matricesP1, P2 and positive scalarsε1, ε2, ε3, ε4, ε5


































(dM − dm + 1)P2 − P1 +Ω 0 −ε3R2 0 −ε2Q2 0 0
∗ −P2 − ε5S1 0 0 0 −ε5S2 0
∗ ∗ −ε3I 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ −ε4I 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −ε2I 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −ε5I 0
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TΛCH1, R2 = −H
T
1 C
T (Λ + I)/2,




and the constantr0 > 1 in (13) is the solution to the following equation
−λmin(−Ξ)r0 + (r0 − 1)λmax(P1) + 2r0(dM − dm + 1)λmax(P2)(r
dM
0 − 1) = 0, (14)
andζ(r0) is given as follows






0 − 1)(dM − dm + 1),
ν = dMmax(λmax(P1), (dM − dm + 1)λmax(P2)).
(16)
Proof: Construct the following energy-like functional



















The mathematical expectation of the difference of the energy-like functional along the system (11) is calculated
as follows:
E{∆V (k)}
=E{∆V1(k)} + E{∆V2(k)} + E{∆V3(k)}
=E
{
ηT (k + 1)P1η(k + 1)− η
T (k)P1η(k) + (dM − dm + 1)η
T (k)P2η(k)− η
T (k − d(k))P2η(k − d(k))
}
=E{ηT (k)(ÃTP1Ã+ (dM − dm + 1)P2 − P1)η(k) + η




d (H1η(k − d(k)))B̃
T




2ξT (k)NTHT2 P1H2Nξ(k) + 2η
T (k)ÃTP1Ãdη(k − d(k))
+ 2ηT (k)ÃTP1B̃f(H1η(k)) + 2η
T (k)ÃTP1B̃dfd(H1η(k − d(k))) + 2η
T (k)ÃTP1D̃w(k)
+ 2ηT (k)ÃTP1Ẽσ(CH1η(k)) − 2β̄η
T (k)ÃTP1H2Nξ(k) + 2η
T (k − d(k))ÃTd P1B̃f(H1η(k))
+ 2ηT (k − d(k))ÃTd P1B̃dfd(H1η(k − d(k))) + 2η
T (k − d(k))ÃTd P1D̃w(k) + 2η
T (k − d(k))ÃTd P1Ẽσ(CH1η(k))
− 2β̄ηT (k − d(k))ÃTd P1H2Nξ(k) + 2f
T (H1η(k))B̃








d (H1η(k − d(k)))B̃
T
d P1D̃w(k)
+ 2fTd (H1η(k − d(k)))B̃
T
d P1Ẽσ(CH1η(k)) − 2β̄f
T
d (H1η(k − d(k)))B̃
T
d P1H2Nξ(k)





By noting (2), (5), (7), (10) andEw2(k) ≤ δ2, it can be obtained further that
E{∆V (k)}
≤E{ηT (k)(ÃTP1Ã+ (dM − dm + 1)P2 − P1)η(k) + η




d (H1η(k − d(k)))B̃
T




2ξT (k)NTHT2 P1H2Nξ(k) + 2η
T (k)ÃTP1Ãdη(k − d(k))
+ 2ηT (k)ÃTP1B̃f(H1η(k)) + 2η
T (k)ÃTP1B̃dfd(H1η(k − d(k))) + 2η
T (k)ÃTP1D̃w(k)
+ 2ηT (k)ÃTP1Ẽσ(CH1η(k)) − 2β̄η
T (k)ÃTP1H2Nξ(k) + 2η
T (k − d(k))ÃTd P1B̃f(H1η(k))
+ 2ηT (k − d(k))ÃTd P1B̃dfd(H1η(k − d(k))) + 2η
T (k − d(k))ÃTd P1D̃w(k) + 2η
T (k − d(k))ÃTd P1Ẽσ(CH1η(k))
− 2β̄ηT (k − d(k))ÃTd P1H2Nξ(k) + 2f
T (H1η(k))B̃








d (H1η(k − d(k)))B̃
T
d P1D̃w(k)
+ 2fTd (H1η(k − d(k)))B̃
T
d P1Ẽσ(CH1η(k)) − 2β̄f
T
d (H1η(k − d(k)))B̃
T
d P1H2Nξ(k)






T (k)ξ(k)) − ε2[f(H1η(k)) −K1H1η(k)]
T [f(H1η(k)) −K2H1η(k)]
− ε3[σ(CH1η(k)) − ΛCH1η(k)]
T [σ(CH1η(k)) − CH1η(k)] + ε4(δ
2 − wT (k)w(k))
− ε5[fd(H1η(k − d(k))) − T1H1η(k − d(k))]
T [fd(H1η(k − d(k))) − T2H1η(k − d(k))]}
=E
{







ηT (k) ηT (k − d(k)) σT (CH1η(k)) w
T (k) fT (H1η(k)) f
T




By considering (13), it is easily known that
E{∆V (k)} ≤ − λmin(−Ξ)E{‖η(k)‖
2}+ θ2. (21)
On the other hand, according to the definition of the energy-like functionalV (k), it is seen that
V (k) ≤ λmax(P1)E{‖η(k)‖





Now we introduce a scalarr > 1 and it follows from (21) and (22) that
E{rk+1V (k + 1)} − E{rkV (k)}
=rk+1E{∆V (k)} + rk+1E{V (k)} − rkE{V (k)}
≤rk+1[−λmin(−Ξ)E{‖η(k)‖








a(r) = −λmin(−Ξ)r + (r − 1)λmax(P1),
b(r) = (dM − dm + 1)(r − 1)λmax(P2).
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For any integerT ≥ dM + 1, summing up both sides of (23) from0 to T − 1 with respect tok yields






































































Substituting (24) and (25), we have





















Sinceξ(1) = −λmin(−Ξ) < 0 andlimr→∞ ξ(r) = +∞, there exists a scalarr0 > 1 such thatξ(r0) = 0. Hence,
we find a scalar 0 > 1 such that


























E{‖e(i)‖2} ≤ 2δ22 ,
(28)









































By noting (13), it can be obtained thatE{‖e(T )‖2} ≤ δ23 which, from Definition 1, implies that the filtering error
system (10) is(δ, δ1, δ2, δ3)-secure and therefore the proof of Theorem 1 is complete.
Remark 4: It should be mentioned that, the aim of constructing a Lyapunov functional is to analyze the stability
for systems according to the traditional Lyapunov stability theory. In Theorem 1, however, we are interested in the
boundedness (rather than the stability) of the filter errorsand the proposed energy-like functional is employed to
deduce the boundedness conditions.
According to the analysis conducted in Theorem 1, a solutionto the secure filtering problem with ROSSs and
RODAs is obtained in the following theorem. For the convenience of design, the positive definite matrixP1 is taken
asP1 = diag {P11, P22} whereP11 andP22 are positive definite matrices.
Theorem 2:Let the positive scalarsδ, δ1, δ2, δ3 be given. If there exist positive definite matricesP1 = diag {P11, P22},







































(dM − dm + 1)P2 − P1 +Ω 0 −ε3R2 0 −ε2Q2 0 0
∗ −P2 − ε5S1 0 0 0 −ε5S2 0
∗ ∗ −ε3I 0 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ −ε4I 0 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −ε2I 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ −ε5I 0

















Â P1Ãd Ê 0 P1B̃ P1B̃d −β̄H2Y
0 0 0 D̂ 0 0 0
]T


















and the constantr0 > 1 in (32) becomes the solution to the following equation
−λmin(−Π)r0 + (r0 − 1)λmax(P1) + 2r0(dM − dm + 1)λmax(P2)(r
dM
0 − 1) = 0, (33)
then, the filtering error system (10) is(δ, δ1, δ2, δ3)-secure. In this case, the filter gain matrices are given by
F = P−122 X,
N = P−122 Y.
(34)
FINAL VERSION 11

















P1Ã P1Ãd P1Ẽ 0 P1B̃ P1B̃d −β̄P1H2N





By settingX = P22F andY = P22N , it is easily seen thatΠ < 0 is exactly as the same as inequality (36) which
means that the conditions in Theorem 1 are satisfied and the rest of the proof of Theorem 2 follows Theorem 1
directly.
Until now, we have analyzed security issue for the filtering error system with randomly occurring both sensor
saturations and deception attacks, and obtained a sufficient ondition which ensures the(δ, δ1, δ2, δ3)-security of
the filtering error system. In Theorem 2, the design method ofthe desired filter has been given.
Remark 5: In Theorems 1-2, the security-guaranteed filtering problemis solved for a class of nonlinear stochastic
discrete time-delay systems with ROSSs and RODAs. The new concept of(δ, δ1, δ2, δ3)-security is proposed to reflect
the degree of security against the noise intensity, the energy bound of the false signals and the energy of the initial
system state, all of which are included in the main results inaddition to the sector-bound of the nonlinearities
as well as the bounds of the time-delays. An energy-like functio al is constructed to derive the delay-dependent
security criteria and the corresponding solvability conditions for the desired filter gains are expressed in terms of
the feasibility of few linear matrix inequalities (LMIs) that can be solved using available software package.
Remark 6: It is worth mentioning that this paper is not concerned with the attack detection issue. However, no
matter how strong the attack is, a security-guaranteed filter can be always obtained by using the proposed design
approach.
IV. I LLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, a numerical simulation example is given to sh w the effectiveness of the filtering methods proposed



























, dm = 1, dM = 5.
The nonlinear functions are chosen to be
f(x(k)) = sign(x(k))log(sign(x(k))x(k) + 1),
fd(x(k − d(k))) = sign(x(k − d(k)))log(sign(x(k − d(k)))x(k − d(k)) + 1).
It is easy to see that functionsf andfd satisfy the sector-bounded conditions (2) with parameters

















, D2 = 1.
Moreover, the sensor saturation parameter is set asΛ = 0.5 and the probabilities of saturations and deception
attacks are assumed to beᾱ = 0.2 and β̄ = 0.3. The parametersδ, δ1, δ2 andδ3 are taken as0.3, 0.2, 0.3 and1.2,
respectively.
With the above parameters, the inequality in (32) is solved by using the Matlab software (with the YALMIP 3.0)












In the simulation, the disturbance from attackers is selectd asξ(k) = δ1 and the initial values of the state




. The simulation results are
shown in Figs. 1-6. Figs. 1-2 plot the actually occurring time instants of sensor saturations and deception attacks,
respectively. Figs. 3-4 depict the state trajectories and their estimates. The norm of filtering errors in the presence
of sensor saturations and deception attacks is shown in Fig.5, from which we can see that the norm is always
below the given boundδ3. Also, the relation between the norm of filtering error and the attack bound is shown in
Fig. 6. It can be seen from Fig. 6 that the norm of the filtering error will increase when the attack bound becomes
large. The simulation results have demonstrated the effectiveness of the designed filter.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have discussed the secure filtering problemfor a class of nonlinear stochastic discrete time-delay
systems with both ROSSs and RODAs. A novel measurement output model has been provided to describe the ROSSs
and RODAs within a unified framework. Then, by using the stochastic analysis techniques, a sufficient condition
has been obtained to guarantee the security requirement of the addressed systems. Furthermore, the design method
of the desired secure filter gain has been obtained by solvinga linear matrix inequality with nonlinear constraints.
Finally, a numerical example has been exploited to show the usefulness of the filtering scheme derived in this paper.
One of the future research topics would be the extension of our main results to the distributed filtering problems
over wireless sensor networks [23].













Fig. 1: Occurring of sensor saturations.













Fig. 2: Occurring of deception attacks.
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Fig. 3: Statex1(k) and its estimatêx1(k).
















Fig. 4: Statex2(k) and its estimatêx2(k).














Fig. 5: The norm of filtering errors with both sensor
saturations and deception attacks.












Fig. 6: The average norm of filtering errors.
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